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One of the most influential justifications for environmental
regulation is under attack. The "race to the bottom" posits that
states and nations "race from the desirable levels of environment
quality" they "would pursue if they did not face competition for
industry to the increasingly undesirable levels that they choose in
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
the face of such competition."1 After years of acceptance, some
scholars now cast doubt on this proposition, arguing that market
competition promotes optimal levels of environmental regulation.2
Unfortunately, these arguments have played out almost
exclusively on theoretical battlegrounds; very few empirical
studies of the "race to the bottom" exist.
Recognizing the peril of utilizing an untested theory to justify
environmental regulation, this Comment aims to fill the gap in the
discourse. After identifying the central arguments of the
proponents and opponents of the "race to the bottom" theory, this
Comment examines Cuban environmental reforms in the face of
economic difficulties. Such an empirical focus not only provides
insight into the development of the Cuban environmental regime,
but also allows a more thorough consideration of the current
academic debate surrounding the "race to the bottom."
I. Theoretical Underpinnings of the "Race to the Bottom"
A. Introduction
"The widely accepted theoretical model for the race to the
bottom,"3  the Prisoner's Dilemma, was first applied to
environmental problems in 1968 by Garrett Hardin.4  The
Prisoner's Dilemma posits that when given the option, individual
parties act in their own self-interest even when contrary collective
action will produce more beneficial results.5 Like the "race to the
bottom," the Prisoner's Dilemma argues for state intervention to
curb this destructive phenomenon.6 Hardin's variation of the
Prisoner's Dilemma applicable in the context of environmental
I Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1210 (1992).
2 See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
3 Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race " and
Is It "to the Bottom "?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 274 (1997).
4 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968).
5 SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 36-37 (1995).
6 Id. at 37.
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regulation, "The Tragedy of the Commons,"7 predicted that federal
environmental decisions would produce superior individual and
collective results rather than rational, yet counter-productive, state
decisions.8
By 1977, Professor Richard B. Stewart noted that the
perceived "Tragedy of the Commons" was a key factor in the
explosion of federal environmental legislation in the United
States.9  Stewart argued that the motivation behind federal
regulation is the fear that, "in the absence of a non-degradation
requirement, clean states might compete with one another for new
development, leading to a 'commons' dilemma in which each state
permits more degradation than it would prefer or allow if
transaction costs did not preclude agreement with competing
states.""0 While Stewart wrote largely to highlight the fact that the
"race to the bottom" was already driving federal environmental
policies," his seminal 1977 article provided a further academic
foundation for centralizing environmental regulation. 2
In the years following these initial applications of the "race to
the bottom" in the environmental context, the rationale for federal
regulation was commonly accepted. Commentators cautioned that
suboptimal environmental results inevitably occurred without
7 See Joshua D. Samoff, The Continuing Imperative (But Only from a National
Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 225,
278 n. 183 (1997) (describing the "Tragedy of the Commons" as the manifestation of the
"race to the bottom").
8 See Hardin, supra note 4, at 1243.
9 Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1211 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice].
10 Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-
Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from
the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REv. 713, 747 (1977) [hereinafter Stewart, Environmental
Decisionmaking].
I I See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 9; Stewart, Environmental
Decisionmaking, supra note 10. For example, the legislative history of the Clean Air
Act argues that "the promulgation of Federal emission standards for new sources ... will
preclude efforts on the part of States to compete with each other in trying to attract new
plants and facilities without assuring adequate control of extra-hazardous or large-scale
emissions therefrom." H.R. Rep. No. 1146, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5356, 5358.
12 See Revesz, supra note 1.
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centralized regulation, as "each state has an incentive to offer the
least protection to its workers and residents in order to attract
industry., 13  Legislators acted on this principle in passing the
Clean Air Act, which promulgated federal standards for air
pollution. 4 In justifying its promulgation of minimum air quality
standards for the country, 5 Congress relied on the "race to the
bottom," arguing that:
[A] state deciding to protect its clean air resources will face a
double threat. The prospect is very real that such a state will
lose existing industrial plants to more permissive states. But
additionally the state will likely become the target of
"economic-environmental blackmail" from new industrial plants
that will play one state off against another with threats to locate
in whichever state adopts the most permissive pollution
controls. 16
Less than a decade after its first application in the field of
environmental regulation, the "race to the bottom" was animating
the "most comprehensive of modem federal [environmental]
statutes," the Clean Air Act.'7
B. The "Race to the Bottom " in an International Context
The preceding discussion of the "race to the bottom" focused
on the theory's application in the American federalist system of
government. This section explores the "race to the bottom" in an
international context. The general principle that a state could
derive a comparative advantage in its quest for industry by
lowering its environmental standards applies to a nation seeking
an edge in the global marketplace. 8 It is easy to imagine how
such an international "race to the bottom" would evolve:
13 Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1984).
14 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, &
POLICY 105-06 (3d ed. 2000).
15 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
16 H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 136 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077,
1213.
17 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1224.
18 Richard Stewart, International Trade and the Environment, 49 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1329, 1329 (1992) [hereinafter Stewart, International Trade and the Environment].
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Each nation, acting independently, fears that other nations will
adopt lax environmental requirements, and that it will therefore
suffer serious competitive disadvantage by adopting the more
stringent standard that it would prefer. Since each nation
reasons in the same way, all adopt less stringent requirements
than they would prefer individually.' 9
Just as in the federal context, the perception that lower
environmental standards result in greater economic growth could
produce a "race to the bottom" even if there was no actual causal
relationship between the level of regulation and financial results.2"
The significant distinction between the "race to the bottom" in
an international, as opposed to federal, context is that it would be
more acute on the global stage. In a federal system such as the
United States, certain environmental minimums can be required of
each state.21 On the global stage, there is no comparable coercive
power." This is not to say that intergovernmental organizations
("IGOs") such as the United Nations are powerless." The power
of IGOs is limited, however, by the fundamental reality that
nations can only be bound by international agreements if they
19 Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International
Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2058 (1993) [hereinafter Stewart, Environmental
Regulation and International Competitiveness].
20 Id. at 2056. Stewart notes that:
Many people in industry, environmental groups, and Congress argue
that differences in national environmental requirements do have a
significant impact on competitiveness, and that U.S. industry is
suffering as a result of disparities between relatively stringent U.S.
regulatory standards and those of many U.S. trading partners. In
politics, appearance and belief become reality.
Id. at 2085.
21 For example, the aforementioned Clean Air Act establishes minimum air quality
standards which are applicable to each state in the United States. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7642 (1988).
22 See Developments in the Law: International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1484, 1587 (1991) [hereinafter Developments].
23 On the contrary, these organizations "play an indispensable role in the creation
and enforcement of international law." Id. at 1586. Recent years have seen a
proliferation of international environmental agreements on matters ranging from
endangered species to marine pollution. See LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL.,
SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & WORLD
ORDER 103-1124 (1994) (excerpts of environmental treaties). Such treaties are almost
always initiated by IGOs. Developments, supra note 22, at 1587.
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choose to accept them.24 For example, consider the United States
and the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.25 Despite its status as
a large emitter of greenhouses gases,26  the international
community could do nothing to compel the United States to curb
emissions when the country failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.27
This lack of international "authority binding either on states or on
individuals"28 means that there is nothing to stop a nation from
failing to comply with environmental regulations if it chooses to
do so in order to attract capital.
C. Questioning the "Race to the Bottom"
The "race to the bottom" was largely viewed as a fact of
environmental regulation throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and into
the 1990s. This unquestioning acceptance ended with the 1992
publication of Professor Richard Revesz's influential article,
"Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race-to-
the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation."29
Harshly criticizing the status quo, Revesz concluded "that the
forces of interstate competition, far from being conclusively
undesirable, are at least presumptively beneficial. 30
Revesz based this conclusion on a theoretical critique of the
"race to the bottom." Questioning the theory's underpinnings,
Revesz stated, "[t]here are no formal models supporting the
proposition that competition among states creates a prisoner's
dilemma in which states, contrary to their interests, compete for
24 See D. BOwETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 146 (1982).
25 The Kyoto Protocol was "an agreement designed to protect the environment by
setting targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by signatory countries." Greg
Kahn, The Fate of the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush Administration, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 548, 550 (2003).
26 See id. at 550.
27 See generally id. It was under President George W. Bush that United States
participation in the Kyoto Protocol was allowed to wither. See id. at 551-55. Ironically,
President Bush's opposition was based in part on the fact that other nations with major
populations were not required to comply with the agreement. Letter to Members of the
Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 444
(Mar. 19, 2001).
28 Developments, supra note 22, at 1587.
29 See generally Revesz, supra note 1.
30 Id. at 1253.
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industry by offering progressively laxer standards." 3' Seeking to
exploit this supposed theoretical vacuum, Revesz sought to dispel
the notion of a "race to the bottom" using neoclassical economic
theory.32 Instead of a "race to the bottom," neoclassical economic
theory predicts jurisdictions "will seek to maximize their social
welfare" and, therefore, "will not set suboptimally lax
environmental standards."33  On the basis of this theoretical
foundation, Revesz concluded that "competition among states for
industry should not be expected to lead to a race that decreases
social welfare," but instead, "such competition can be expected to
produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity among the
states.
34
Scholars fiercely rebutted Revesz's rejection of the "race to the
bottom." Traditionalists, such as Professor Kirsten Engel,
challenged Revesz's contention that theoretical support for the
"race to the bottom" was weak, pointing out that the "Prisoner's
Dilemma was applied to the generation of public goods as early as
1965... and applied specifically to environmental problems in
1968." 3" Engel found support for the "race to the bottom" not
merely in such historical applications but in Revesz's article as
well. Engel deemed Revesz's "claim for the theoretical vacuum
underlying the race to the bottom" nothing short of "puzzling,
3 6
given his skillful description of how a race to the bottom could
envelope an island jurisdiction.37 Engel questioned how Revesz
could construct "a simple game-theoretic model illustrating how
interstate competition might theoretically lead to a race to the
bottom" and simultaneously argue no models support such an
31 Id. at 1242.
32 See id. In particular, Revesz focuses on the writings of nonclassical economists
Charles Tiebout, William Fischel, Wallace Oates, and Robert Schwab. Id. at 1236-44.
33 Id. at 1242.
34 Id. at 1211-12.
35 Engel, supra note 3, at 298.
36 Id. at 297 n.73.
37 See Revesz, supra note 1, at 1233. Revesz's purpose in creating this model was
simply to describe what he was questioning. However, his creation of a compelling
model articulating the "race to the bottom" is inconsistent with his assertion that "there
are no formal models supporting the proposition that competition among states creates a
prisoner's dilemma in which states, contrary to their interests, compete for industry by
offering progressive laxer standards." Id. at 1242.
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argument.38
Not only did traditionalists seek to bolster the theoretical
underpinnings of the "race to the bottom," but they also attempted
to undermine the neoclassical economic theory that led Revesz to
endorse interstate competition. Highlighting that they only
predicted efficient outcomes when accompanied by a broad array
of assumptions,39 traditionalists were quick to dismiss neoclassical
economic theories as unrealistic."n As soon as these assumptions
were eliminated, even the neoclassical economists upon whom
Revesz relied stipulated that "efficient outcomes, not surprisingly,
are not to be expected."'" Conceding that competition may indeed
produce optimal environmental standards within the world created
by neoclassical economic models,42 traditionalists focused on the
fact that the narrow world of these theories bore little relationship
to "the reality of environmental regulation."'43 The basic critique is
that Revesz slides "too easily from conclusions within the context
of his stylized models to claims about the real world."44
II. Empirically Evaluating the "Race to the Bottom"
A. The Current State of Empirical Studies
Given the ample theoretical discussion and the great impact
the "race to the bottom" has had upon policymaking, one might
assume the theory has been subjected to thorough empirical
38 Engel, supra note 3, at 297 n.73.
39 Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
67, 90 (1996). Specifically, Swire notes that "Revesz and the economists... assume...
[that] the effects of pollution are felt entirely within the state creating the problem," that
"states can measure both the costs and benefits of environmental restrictions, and can
determine the 'socially optimal levels of pollution reduction,"' and that "state decision-
makers automatically and effectively achieve the preferences of their citizens." Id.
40 See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REv.
570, 635 (1996).
41 Wallace E. Oates & Robert Schwab, Economic Competition Among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 350
(1988).
42 Swire, supra note 39, at 88.
43 Id. at 95.
44 Id.
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testing. However, there is a lack of such evidence in the scholastic
universe. While there are many studies documenting the limited
effect environmental standards have on firm location decisions,45
little attention has been given to the related question of whether
when states relax environmental standards in an effort to attract
industry,46 that is a clear manifestation of the "race to the bottom."
Perhaps this explains the revolutionary impact of Revesz's article
Rehabilitating Interstate Competition, which contained no
empirical support for its broad reformation of the "race to the
bottom" debate.4"
Those writing in the wake of Revesz recognize this fact in
arguing "that the problem" in the "race to the bottom" discourse
"is not a lack of theory ... but too little empirical evidence.
' ' g
While the "race to the bottom" and Revesz's neoclassical
economic revision both have their theoretical strengths and
weakness, "the ultimate test of a model is its real world predicative
ability. 49 Commentators argue that this fact is particularly true
when dealing "in the realities of environmental problems and
regulation" because theory "often fails to capture the unique
features of the ecological domain."5 °
In her 1997 test of the theory underlying the "race to the
bottom," Engel compiled a survey of five groups of environmental
standard setters: state environmental regulators, state legislators,
state development agency officials, state chamber of commerce
officials, and directors and staff members of state citizen
45 See, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL, MANUFACTURING ON THE MOVE 55-58 (1993);
WILLIAM R. LOWRY, THE DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM: STATE GOVERNMENTS AND
POLLUTION CONTROL POLICIES 12-15 (1992); ROGER W. SCHMENNER, MAKING BUSINESS
LOCATION DECISIONS 39-41 (1982); Michael Epping, Tradition in Transition: The
Emergence of New Categories in Plant Location, 19 ARK. BUS. & ECON. REV. 16 (1986);
Joseph Friedman et al., What Attracts Foreign Multinational Corporations? Evidence
from Branch Plant Location in the United States, 32 J. REGION SCI. 403, 410-14 (1992);
Paul H. Templet & Stephen Farber, The Complementarity Between Environmental and
Economic Risk: An Empirical Analysis, 9 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 153 (1994).
46 Engel, supra note 3, at 338.
47 See generally Revesz, supra note 1.
48 Engel, supra note 3, at 277-78.
49 See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 27-28
(1991).
50 Esty, supra note 40, at 613.
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environmental organizations." On the basis of these surveys,
Engel reached the conclusion that despite "differences in
environmental standards [that] are a statistically insignificant
predictor of firm location ... a substantial portion of states will
nonetheless apparently relax their environmental standards out of
concern over industry relocation and siting.
' 52
Engel based this overall conclusion on three findings from her
survey. 3  First, responses to questionnaires revealed "the
possibility that industry might relocate or site a new plant
elsewhere is something of a concern to the environmental
regulators in many states, and affects environmental policy-
making in some manner in most states."54 Second, Engel's study
found states attempted to mimic the environmental standards of
other states, particularly those nearby.5 Finally, "concern over
industry relocation and siting causes state legislators and business
groups to exert substantial pressure upon state environmental
regulators to relax the strictures of state environmental
programs. 56
While problematic to draw broad conclusions on the basis of
eighty surveys of environmental regulators,57 Engel's data
represents the only empirical study of a "race to the bottom."
Therefore, it merits deference. Nevertheless, instead of accepting
the findings of Engel's landmark studies, this Comment attempts
to produce additional empirical data from which to draw stronger
conclusions.
B. Advancing the Debate through a Country Specific Study
i. Why Study Cuba in the "Race to the Bottom"
51 Engel, supra note 3, at 337-38.
52 Id. at 316. The disconnect between evidence showing environmental standards
is not determinative in plant sitings and persistent decisions to relax governmental
regulation in order to attract industry is usually explained by the enduring perception that
rolling back environmental standards will net a jurisdiction economic gain. See, e.g.,
Samoff, supra note 7, at 280; Swire, supra note 39, at 109.
53 Engel, supra note 3, at 340-46.
54 Id. at 340-41.
55 See id. at 344-45.
56 Id. at 346.
57 See id. at 341.
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Context?
Cuba is the focal point of this Comment's empirical test of the
"race to the bottom" because of the setting created by the
country's recent economic difficulties and subsequent regulation
of the environment. Scholars have asserted that countries with
developing economies "will prefer to adopt a lower level of
environmental quality in order to achieve a higher and more
rapidly growing domestic income. ' ' 8  If ever there was an
economy in need of capital influx, regardless of the environmental
consequences, it is Cuba. With the fall of the Soviet Union in
1990, nearly $6 billion in annual Soviet subsidies to Cuba
disappeared overnight. 9 In addition to losing its main economic
benefactor,6" Cuba lost its main source of imports6 and over 85%
of foreign markets for its goods.62 In the years that followed, a
veritable economic depression ensued.63 Manufacturing output
decreased by 28%,64 exports and imports declined by seventy-nine
and 75%, respectively,6 5 and the gross domestic product decreased
58 Ralph C. d'Arge & Allen V. Kneese, Environmental Quality and International
Trade, 26 INT'L ORG. 419, 434 (1972). This is not just a value determination made by
decisionmakers in developing countries as "citizens of developing countries often place a
lower value on reduction environmental externalities than citizens of developed
countries." Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,
supra note 19, at 2099.
59 Jonathan R. Coleman, The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions with Respect to
Cuba, in 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 86,87 (2001).
60 See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001: Evaluation of
Performance and Debate on the Future, in 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 1, 4 (2001)
[hereinafter Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001].
61 Jose Alvarez & William A. Messina, Jr., Cuba's New Agricultural Cooperatives
and Markets: Antecedents, Organization, Early Performance and Prospects, in 6 CUBA
IN TRANSITION 175, 175 (1996). Socialist bloc countries were the origin of
approximately 86% of Cuban imports in the late 1980s. Id.
62 Paolo Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation on Foreign
Investment in Cuba, in 11 CUBA IN TRANSITION 18, 19 (2001) [hereinafter Spadoni, The
Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation].
63 See Maria Dolores Espino, Cuban Tourism During the Special Period, in 10
CUBA IN TRANSITION 360, 360 (2000).
64 CARMELO MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES:
COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE: CHILE, CUBA, AND COSTA RICA 328 (2000)
[hereinafter MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES].
65 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 3.
2004]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
by more than 40%.66 The impact upon the Cuban people was
dramatic: employment fell nearly 7%, real wages plummeted 40%
in Cuba's cities, and "personal consumption declined 15% each
year until 1994. "67
The government responded to this economic crisis, referred to
as the "special period in time of peace,"68 by gradually shifting
from total state control of the economy toward capitalist
practices.69  The government legalized the use of American
currency, broke up state monopolies on land to establish
agricultural cooperatives, 70  authorized self-employment,7  and
encouraged foreign investment in the Cuban economy.72 New
regulations authorized three distinct options for foreign investors:
joint ventures, 73 international economic associations (IEAs),74 and
companies completely backed by foreign capital.75
In order to persuade reluctant foreign entrepreneurs, the
government recognized mixed enterprises owned in part by
foreign corporations 76  and allowed these organizations
considerable autonomy.77  The government permitted mixed
66 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 19.
67 Charles P. Trumbull IV, Economic Reforms and Social Contradictions in Cuba,
in 10 CUBA IN TRANSITION 305, 306 (2000).
68 SERGIO DIAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE F. PEREZ-LOPEZ, CONQUERING NATURE: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF SOCIALISM IN CUBA 3 (2000).
69 SHELDON SMITH, LATIN AMERICA IN TRANSITION: THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON
ECOLOGY, POWER, AND DIVERSITY 308 (2003).
70 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 19.
71 Id.
72 Coleman, supra note 59, at 87.
73 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P. Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment in Cuba:
Prospects and Perils, in 12 CUBA IN TRANSITION 179, 180 (2002). "A joint venture is a
legal entity consisting of one or more Cuban parties and one or more foreign investors."
Id.
74 Id. IEAs are organizations which do "not require the establishment of a legal
entity separate from the contracting parties." Id. at 181. In short, "each party agrees to
make specific contributions to the IEA, but no capital is set aside" by the respective
parties. The most common form of IEAs are production or management contracts. Id.
75 Id. at 180. These "enterprises... are totally owned by foreign investors." Id. at
182.
76 Frederic Evenson, A Deeper Shade of Green: The Evolution of Cuban
Environmental Law and Policy, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 516-17 (1998).
77 Trumbull, supra note 67, at 307.
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enterprises to choose their own staffing patterns, establish
individual production plans,78 classify the nature of their products,
select their boards of directors, set prices, and transfer earnings
abroad via convertible currency.79 The novelty of a communist
nation permitting the influx of private foreign capital into an
economy previously under exclusive governmental control cannot
be understated.80
These efforts increased foreign activity in the Cuban
economy."' By the end of 2001, 412 international business
associations were operating in Cuba,82 with the number of foreign
enterprises increasing by thirty each year.83  These foreign
enterprises have begun to play a large role in Cuba's export
economy. In 2001, for instance, foreign-investor export revenue
was $768.2 million,84 accounting for nearly 15% of Cuban
exports.85 In addition, numerous important Cuban industries rely
on foreign funding.86  For example, all investment in oil
exploration, metal mining, lubricants, and personal hygiene
products comes from foreign sources,8 7 while sizable amounts of
foreign money are found in the citrus, cement, and international
tourism industries.88 In total, cumulative foreign investment in
Cuba increased from $2.1 billion in 1995 to $4.3 billion in 2000.89
Although foreign investment played a role in ending the
78 DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY CUBA 254 (2d ed. 2003).
79 Trumbull, supra note 67, at 307.
80 Paolo Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Recent Developments and Role in
the Economy, in 12 CUBA N TRANSITION 158, 158 (2002) [hereinafter Spadoni, Foreign
Investment in Cuba].
81 Id. at 160-61.
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 Id. at 173.
85 Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 73, at 185.
86 Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 80, at 175.
87 Idat 174.
88 Id at 174-75. The levels of foreign investment in the citrus, cement, and
international tourism industries are 70%, 50%, and 49%, respectively. Id.
89 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 5.
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depression of the early 1990s, 90 it has not been a cure-all for
Cuba's economic problems. 91 Significant obstacles to conducting
business in Cuba remain for foreign investors.92 In 1996, the
United States Congress enacted the Helms-Burton legislation, 9
which codified America's long-running economic sanctions
against Cuba94 and sought to "complicate Havana's access to
external financing as well as to create a riskier and more uncertain
business environment for [foreign] companies investing in the
Caribbean nation., 95 In addition to the complications posed by the
Helms-Burton legislation, potential foreign investors must go
through a rigorous bureaucratic process in order to have their
investment proposals accepted by the Cuban government.96 The
inability to fully capitalize on revenue from foreign investment,
coupled with the severe economic depression of the early 1990s, 9'
leaves the island nation in a perilous economic situation.98 Nearly
a decade later, Cuban exports and imports today continue to lag
behind 1980s trading levels.99 Consequently, the gross domestic
product has increased at far more modest levels than it decreased
in the early 1990s. l°° In short, although Cuban economic recovery
has begun, there is still much room for growth.
90 Id. at 2.
91 id. at 3.
92 See, e.g., Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 73, at 186-92.
93 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (2002).
94 Id.
95 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 18.
96 Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 73, at 186-92. In particular, the authors
highlight the Cuban government's generally "restrictive approach to foreign investment,"
and the bureaucratic impediments it has erected, particularly in regards to labor relations
as serious obstacles to foreign investment in Cuba. Id.
97 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 19
(noting that Cuba's gross domestic product decreased by more than 40% in the early
1990s).
98 See, e.g., MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES, supra note
64, at 328; Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 3.
99 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 3.
100 MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES, supra note 64, at
328. From 1991 to 1993, the Cuban gross domestic product decreased an average of
12.4%. Comparatively, the gross domestic product increased by only 0.7% in 1994,
1.9% in 1995, and 7.1% in 1996. Id.
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This snapshot of the Cuban economy reveals why the island
nation is the subject of this critical analysis of the "race to the
bottom." ' Cuba is a nation that over the past fifteen years has
suffered severe economic displacement. Its attempts to re-
structure its economy have only partially alleviated these
problems. In attempting to resurrect its economy, Cuba has
demonstrated a willingness to bend- or break previously adhered to
rules to attract capital.'0 2 Based on this information, adherents of
the "race to the bottom" would hypothesize that Cuba's need for
economic investment would lead to a rejection of environmental
regulation.
101 Apart from its implications for the "race to the bottom" debate, recent
developments in Cuban environmental law merit study due to their ramifications on one
of the world's most diverse landscapes. When Christopher Columbus first reached Cuba,
he reported that "th[e] island [was] the most beautiful that eyes have ever seen."
Christopher Columbus, Christopher Columbus "Discovers" Cuba, in THE CUBA READER
9, 11 (2003). As this Comment will discuss, Cuba has not been spared environmental
degradation since Columbus first voyaged to the New World. See, e.g., DIAZ-BRIQUETS
& PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 141 [Table 6.1] (documenting the loss of a large
majority of Cuba's forests since Columbus's landing); Daniel J. Whittle et al.,
International Tourism and Protection of Cuba 's Coastal and Marine Environments, 16
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 533, 540 (2003). It has, however, entered the new millennium
relatively unscathed. DIAZ-BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 17 (noting that
Cuba suffered much less severe environmenal degradation than other Soviet Bloc
nations). What remains in Cuba is worth protecting: Cuba is home to largely natural
coastal environments, Whittle et al., supra at 535, nearly 7,000 plants species, Oliver A.
Houck, Cuba's New Law of the Environment: An Introduction, in CUBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF
CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 1 (1999) (noting that this figure represents more
than one-third of the plant species identified in America and Canada combined)
[hereinafter Houck, Cuba's New Law of the Environment], and an impressive array of
animal life, Whittle et al., supra at 538-40. In fact, "the island has more than 300 species
of birds, 18,000 species of insects, 38,000 species of crustaceans, and 1,500 species of
mollusks." Whittle et al., supra at 538-40. All told "the island supports twelve times as
many mammal species per hectare as the United States and Canada, 29 times as many
amphibians and reptiles, and 39 times as many birds." Houck, Cuba 's New Law of the
Environment, supra at 1. Though its impact on the "race to the bottom" motivates this
Comment, developments in Cuban environmental regulation are also worth chronicling
to judge whether one of the world's most pristine environments will survive
modernization.
102 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 59, at 87 (noting Cuba's decision in the early
1990s to permit and actively seek out foreign investment).
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ii. How Cuba Fits in the "Race to the Bottom " Debate
Given Cuba's need for investment since the early 1990s, the
case for studying its efforts at environmental protection in the
context of the "race to the bottom" is easily stated: if ever there
was a country that would "race from the desirable levels of
environmental quality" attempting to attract capital," 3 it is this
beleaguered Caribbean nation. Cuba does not, however, fit
perfectly into either the traditional "race to the bottom" model" or
the recent revisionist critique.0 5 The traditional "race to the
bottom" envisions robust market competition to which the still
insular Cuban economy is not yet exposed.0 6 Additionally,
Revesz's critique assumes citizens of the jurisdiction in question
are perfectly mobile,'0 7 a requirement Cuba does not fulfill.0 8
Despite these shortcomings, Cuba can still help to shed light on
whether the "race to the bottom" remains a viable theory.
The "race to the bottom" presumes that the state or nation in
question is a competitor for industry.0 9 Prior to the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Cuba relied on its status as a Soviet client state for
economic survival; it was immune from the "race to the bottom"
because it did not have to compete for industry."0 Today, Cuba is
competing in the world marketplace, soliciting foreign investment
from sources as varied as Canada, China, and Europe."'
Nonetheless, it is possible to claim the island nation does not
compete for industry at a sufficient level to make the "race to the
bottom" applicable given the ongoing economic sanctions against
Cuba by the United States. 112 Proponents of this argument point to
103 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1210.
104 See infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
105 See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
107 See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
108 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
109 As mentioned previously, the "race to the bottom" is defined as a "race from
desirable levels of environmental quality" a state or nation "would pursue if they did not
face competition for industry to the increasingly undesirable levels that they choose in
the face of such competition." Revesz, supra note 1, at 1210.
110 See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 59, at 87.
111 See Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 80, at 165 [Figure 4].
112 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (2002).
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the deprivation of $67 billion in trade caused by over forty years
of economic sanctions by the United States113 and evidence that
foreign investment has become less secure in Cuba since the
passage of the Helms-Burton legislation.114
This argument fails to recognize that "U.S. economic sanctions
with respect to Cuba generally had a minimal overall historical
impact on the Cuba economy."' 15 Although Cuba was denied a
great deal of U.S. investment due to economic sanctions," 6 it
adequately replaced these funds with Soviet subsidies through the
1980s. 117  Even following the adoption of the Helms-Burton
legislation, foreign investment in Cuba increased118 as companies
targeted by the legislation have not divested themselves of their
Cuban investments." 9  While sanctions have kept Cuba from
becoming a full-fledged competitor in the global marketplace, its
efforts to encourage foreign investment have eased the island
nation into a more competitive economic stance. These steps have
been successful enough to support a study as to whether initial
Cuban attempts to attract foreign investment have been
accompanied by a lowering of environmental standards, the
telltale sign of a "race to the bottom."
It is also possible to claim that Cuba cannot shed light on the
Revesz critique because it does not fulfill one of his model's
principal assumptions. Revesz's criticism of the "race to the
bottom" rests upon numerous suppositions, including that
"individuals are fully mobile and choose the jurisdiction they live
113 Coleman, supra note 59, at 89.
114 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 27.
Helms-Burton complicates foreign investment in Cuba by allowing American citizens
who had property expropriated without compensation by the Cuban government to sue
foreign companies that "traffic" in that property. Id.
115 Coleman, supra note 59, at 87. This is largely the case because of the presence
of alternative, non-American markets for Cuban goods. Id. at 93.
116 Id. at 89.
117 See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
118 Spadoni, The Impact of the Helms-Burton Legislation, supra note 62, at 35.
Cuba received $568 million in foreign direct investment from 1990 to 1995, before the
implementation of Helms-Burton. Id. In the five years after the passage of this
legislation, 1996 to 2000, Cuba benefited from $1.3 billion in foreign direct investment.
Id.
119 Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 80, at 162.
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in based on the taxes that the jurisdiction imposes on its residents
and the bundle of services... it provides. 12 ° Commentators have
derided Revesz's model as depending on "heroic assumptions,"'1'
including the belief that individuals can move whenever they
choose.122  Such a "restrictive assumption"'123 ignores everyday
events in human life, such as the need to move in response to the
loss of a job. 124 The fact that only 20,000 Cubans are allowed to
immigrate to the United States annually 125 should not eliminate
Cuba from a discussion of Revesz's writing. Rather, it should
highlight a shortcoming in his model. Despite Cuba's failure to
fulfill the mobility requirement, its recent liberalization of foreign
investment rules tests Revesz's central assertion "that the forces of
interstate competition, far from being conclusively undesirable,
are at least presumptively beneficial."' 126
As highlighted by the previous discussion, Cuba is not the
ideal test case for the "race to the bottom" and the recent critique
of this theory. Its quest for foreign investment is too limited and
recent to perfectly test Stewart's concept of the "race to the
bottom," and its citizens are not "fully mobile" as assumed by
Revesz's model. 127 Nonetheless, Cuba is an excellent test of the
overarching theme of the "race to the bottom" that, when faced
with market competition, a state or nation will set its
environmental standards at a suboptimal level in an attempt to
attract industry. 128  Accordingly, further investigation of
developments in environmental policymaking and enforcement on
this island nation are warranted.
120 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1236.
121 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 40, at 635.
122 See id. at 635 n. 243.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Christopher Marquis, U.S. Halts Cuban Immigration Talks; Worsening of Ties
Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A5 [hereinafter Marquis, U.S. Halts Immigration
Talks]. It is possible immigration of Cubans to the United States could end due to
worsening ties between the United States and Cuba, See, e.g., Christopher Marquis,
Bush's Allies Plan to Block Effort to Ease Ban on Cuban Travel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2003, at A6 [hereinafter Marquis, Block Effort to Ease Ban on Cuban Travel].
126 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253.
127 Id. at 1236.
128 Id. at 1210.
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III. Cuba
A. Political Background
United States-Cuban political tensions stem from the 1959
Cuban revolution led by communist leader Fidel Castro.1 29 As the
Castro government forged more intimate ties with the Soviet
Union in the wake of the revolution, the relationship between the
United States and Cuba disintegrated. 30 In 1961, moving to
isolate the Castro government, the United States ceased diplomatic
relations with Cuba. 3' By 1963, the United States forbade the
importation of Cuban goods and exportation of American goods to
Cuba, prohibited American citizens from visiting Cuba, and
pressured other nations to sever their economic and political ties
with the Caribbean island.13 2
Debates on environmental policy frequently break down along
political lines. On the one hand, there are commentators who
approach every mandate undertaken by the Cuban government
with skepticism, refusing to credit it for even the most
unquestionably laudable measure of environmental protection.
13 3
On the other hand, there are commentators whose cheerleading of
129 ANN LOUISE BARDACH, CUBA CONFIDENTIAL: LOVE AND VENGEANCE IN MIAMI
AND HAVANA app. 13 (2002).
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 See id.
133 See e.g., Larry S. Daley, Restoration of Cuban Gallery Forest, Especially on the
Banks of the Bayamo and Other Rivers of the Cauto Basin, in 12 CUBA IN TRANSITION
225, 225 (2002). In his discussion of Cuban forestry issues, Daley asserts, "[iln the Cuba
of the past century, reforestation has not been easy, and mostly unsuccessful. Given its
forty years in power, and absolute authority, a large proportion of responsibility for these
failures can be laid at the feet of the present Cuban government [the Castro regime]." Id.
As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Comment, these charges of forestry
mismanagement are without a factual basis. The data shows that through a program of
limiting annual cutting rates in Cuba's forests, JACK WESTOBY, INTRODUCTION TO
WORLD FORESTRY: PEOPLE AND THEIR TREES 132 (1989), and a massive reforestation
effort, James E. Ross, Factors Affecting the Potential Market in Cuba for Selected U.S.
Forest Products, in 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 103, 103 (1999), the Cuban government has
stemmed the tide of five centuries of consistent deforestation. See DIAZ-BRQUETS &
PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 141 [Table 6.1]. Unfortunately, statements like Daley's
comments on Cuban forestry, which lack a factual basis, are too common in this arena
where political polemic can overpower balanced analysis.
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Cuban environmental protection reforms drowns out the
questionable durability of such changes. 34
Over the years, the level of political and economic tension
between the nations has fluctuated. The late 1970s saw a thaw in
this ongoing dispute, as Presidents Ford and Carter actively
pursued efforts to normalize U.S. relations with Cuba. 135 Lately,
the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. In 1996,
Congress made foreign investment in Cuba a riskier proposition
by passing the aforementioned Helms-Burton legislation.'3 6
President George W. Bush continues this hard-line approach,
expelling numerous Cuban diplomats from the United States, 13 7
suspending immigration talks with Cuban officials,'38 quashing
efforts to make visiting Cuba easier, 39 and attempting to prohibit
Cuban exiles from sending care packages to relatives still living on
the island. 4 ° During these ups and downs, the lack of an open
political and economic relationship between the countries has
remained a constant since the communist takeover in 1959.'1'
Recognizing that an analysis based on preconceived political
opinions prevents a serious inquiry into the efficacy of Cuban
environmental efforts, this Comment eschews preliminary
conclusions. The review first focuses on recent developments in
the Cuban environmental framework and then turns to the
implementation of these environmental policies. Instead of
presumptively dismissing policy advances or failing to inspect the
134 See GLOBAL EXCHANGE, THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION: CUBA'S
EXPERIMENT WITH ORGANIc AGRICULTURE 79-82 (Peter Rosset & Medea Benjamin eds.,
1994) [hereinafter THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION]. In supporting Cuba's
experiment with organic agriculture, the authors skirt the larger question of whether this
transformation "will ultimately be successful" in favor of simply concluding that "what
[the Cubans] have already achieved under conditions of extreme adversity is
impressive." Id. at 82.
135 Id.
136 22 U.S.C. § 6032 (2002).
137 Christopher Marquis, Striving to Punish Cuba, U.S. Expels 14 of Its Diplomats,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A11.
138 Marquis, U.S. Halts Cuban Immigration Talks, supra note 125, at A5.
139 Marquis, Block Effort to Ease Ban on Cuban Travel, supra note 125, at A6.
140 Christopher Marquis, Get-Tough Policy on Cuba May Backfire Against Bush,
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at A16.
141 See generally BARDACH, supra note 129.
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actual impact of these steps, this Comment aims for a critical, yet
fair, evaluation to facilitate the larger study of the "race to the
bottom."
B. Communist Environmental Framework and Enforcement
An examination of the environmental framework in Castro-led
Cuba demonstrates the existence of two distinct eras. The first
era, from the onset of the 1959 Revolution until the early 1990s, is
characterized by ambitious rhetoric on environmental protection142
that generally outstrips legislative results.143 The second era in
Cuban environmental regulation, emerging in the 1990s, has seen
previously unfulfilled promises bolstered by solid advances in the
field of environmental policymaking.1" Inspecting Cuba's history
of environmental legislation and enforcement is the first step
towards determining whether Cuba undermines or underlines the
"race to the bottom."
i. Early Communist Environmental Framework and
Enforcement
Although on the radar of the Castro government since the
Cuban Revolution, progress toward thorough environmental
policymaking was plagued by missteps in the early decades of
communist rule. Exemplifying this is the Law of Agrarian
Reform, one of the first acts undertaken by the revolutionary
government in 1959.45 The act created new national parks, sent
youth conservation brigades into the field, and began a promising
Cuban re-forestation effort.'46 While displaying environmental
consciousness in the field of forestry, this act was not
accompanied by the necessary steps toward creating a thorough
142 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, art. 27 (amended 1992)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA] (establishing governmental
responsibility for environmental protection).
143 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 72 (noting the lack of power
bestowed upon Cuban government agencies in their attempts to protect the environment).
144 See, e.g., Law 81, The Law of the Environment, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1999).
145 Oliver A. Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, 16 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 14
(2000) [hereinafter Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba].
146 Id.
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legislative rubric to address environmental problems.147 Most
notably, the Law of Agrarian Reform failed to create an agency
responsible for environmental protection148  or promulgate
comprehensive environmental regulations outside the field of
forestry. 49
Movement towards a more systematic governmental response
to environmental concerns in Cuba did not begin until the mid-
1970s. The 1976 Cuban Constitution represented the first tangible
steps in this direction, declaring:
To assure the well-being of citizens, the state, and society are
protectors of nature. It falls within the jurisdiction of legally
qualified agencies and of each and every citizen to watch over
the cleanliness of the waters and of the air and protect the soil,
flora, and fauna. 150
Attempting to make good on its promise of state environmental
protection, Cuba established an agency for enforcing
environmental regulations, the National Commission for the
Protection of the Environment and the Conservation of Natural
Resources (COMARNA), later that same year.' 5' Five years later,
seeking "to establish the basic principles for the conservation,
protection, improvement, and transformation of the environment
and the rational use of natural resources,"'52 Cuba passed Law 33,
"On the Protection of the Environment and the Rational Use of
Natural Resources.' 53
Accepting responsibility for environmental protection and
establishing a legislative framework and environmental
enforcement agency would seemingly put the nation on track
toward positive environmental reform. These efforts, however,
did not empower the government to adequately enforce
regulations. The legislative mandate establishing COMARNA
147 See id.
148 See id. at 14.
149 See id. at 23-25.
150 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, supra note 142, at art. 27.
151 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145 at 14-15. See infra notes
154-58 and accompanying text for further discussion of COMARNA.
152 Law 33, On the Protection of the Environmental and the Rational Use of Natural
Resources, available at http://www.medioambiente.cu/legislacionleyes/L-33.htm.
153 Id.
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failed to give the government adequate powers as an implementing
agency, meaning it had little impact. 154 While fulfilling the need
for a governmental agency devoted to environmental protection,
COMARNA was "essentially a conglomerate of all agencies with
environmental responsibilities in Cuba."' 5 Because "the ability to
enforce environmental laws and regulations, and the resources to
do so, rested with other agencies of the Cuban state,"'5 6
COMARNA was relegated to the role of a coordinating agency.'57
Perversely, the power to investigate and curb environmental
degradation rested with agencies "also responsible for economic
production decisions, '  instead of the governmental agency
sanctioned with responsibility for the environment. Given the
shortcomings of COMARNA, the potential for positive
environmental regulation in the early decades of communist rule
in Cuba was not realized.
ii. Latter Day Communist Environmental Framework
and Enforcement
1. Legislative Reforms
The second era in modem Cuban environmental regulation
began in the 1990s when Cuba embarked on an ambitious path,
forcing even skeptical commentators to observe that "by Latin
American standards, socialist Cuba has a well-developed legal
framework of environmental protection."'' 59  These new
developments were marked by a change in the rhetoric of Cuban
environmental policy. While failing to deliver on promises
previously made in this arena, the statements of decision-makers
and legislative documents signaled a shift in the environmental
framework in this instance. At the World Summit in Rio de
Janiero, President Castro spoke in a lofty tone, imploring his
audience to fight for environmental equality as a way to "make
154 See Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 15.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 73.
157 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 72.
158 Id. at 73.
159 Id. at 46.
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human living more rational. 16 . Shortly thereafter, buzzwords
from the conference found their way into the Cuban environmental
lexicon. Before the end of 1992, the Cuban Constitution was
amended 6' to endorse "sustainable economic and social
development."'16
2
Environmental speak would hardly be noteworthy were it not
for the fact that it was a harbinger of change in the field of Cuban
environmental regulation. In 1997, rhetoric was transformed into
reality with the passage of Law 81, "The Law of the
Environment.', 63  Alternatively derided as either overly
ambitious" or exalted as "much more specific and more concrete
than its predecessor,"' 65 Law 81 blazed a new trail in Cuban
environmental policymaking. At its outset, Law 81 recognizes
that "it is necessary to update the legal principles, objectives and
basic concepts of Cuba's environmental policy, institutional
framework and the tools for their implementation, the powers,
functions and duties of the state agencies and bodies and, in
general, the rights and obligation of natural and legal persons.' 66
This desire to revamp the legislative framework resulted in Law
160 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 16 (quoting Cuban
Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA), Workshop: The
Environment and Development 6 (1997)).
161 Id.
162 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, art. 27, in 5 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 8 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed. 2000) [hereinafter THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, Gisbert H. Flanz ed.]
163 Law 81, The Law of the Environment, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE
FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION (1999).
164 Orlando Rey Santos, Reflections on the Legislative Process of the New
Environmental Law, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE FRAMEWORK
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 15
(1999). The Director of CITMA's Environmental Policy Directorate, Orlando Rey
Santos, revealed that "while the majority welcomed the Law with pleasure and goodwill"
there was also "a minority view, which argued, more or less openly, that the Law was
not constructed to fit our particular situation. The conceptual core of this line of thought
was that the Law might well obstruct development by establishing such demanding
standards for a country beleaguered by so many difficulties." Id.
165 Id. at 14.
166 Law 81, The Law of the Environment, Pmbl. in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION (1999).
81 striving to solve problems pertaining to the enforcement of
environmental law through the Ministry of Science, Technology,
and the Environment (CITMA). 6 7  It also resulted in giving
consideration to the environment in Cuba's economic decision-
making through EIAs.'68
a. CITMA
In 1994, the Cuban government consolidated many of the
functions of the recently dissolved COMARNA and numerous
separate environmental institutes into a new organization,
CITMA. 16 9 The feature separating CITMA from previous efforts
at Cuban environmental oversight is the high level of power held
by this governmental agency. 170  Its stature superseded that of
COMARNA as CITMA "marked the first time in Cuba that a
cabinet-level agency was established exclusively for the
environment." 171  Unlike COMARNA, CITMA was the
unquestionably "central... agency for environmental protection,
with power and authority to resolve environmental issues"
independently. 172
The key distinction between CITMA and its predecessor is its
supremacy in the realm of implementing environmental
regulations. 173 Its mandate made this authority clear, directing the
agency to "steer and control the implementation of the policy
aimed at guaranteeing the protection of the environment and the
rational use of resources," "draw up and control the
implementation of the programs that will allow for a better
environmental control," and "settle the disagreements between the
institutions and other entities concerning environmental protection
and the rational use of natural resources.' 74 In short, CITMA was
167 Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Key Environmental Legislation for Cuba Transition
Period, in 9 CUBA IN TRANSITION 386,388 (1999).
168 Id. at 389.
169 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 19.
170 See id. at 19-20; Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 552.
171 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 552.
172 Travieso-Diaz, supra note 167, at 388.
173 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 73.
174 MINISTRY OF Sci., TECH. & ENV'T, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 6
(1997) (quoting Agreement No. 2823 of the Executive Committee of the Council of
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given what COMARNA lacked: the power to enforce
environmental legislation. Prior to this legislative grant, ministries
accountable for the management of certain natural resources were
concurrently responsible for the economic productivity associated
with this resource.175 With this contradiction addressed, CITMA
may develop into an effective environmental protection agency.
At present, it is too soon to determine whether CITMA has
produced tangible results. However, there are preliminary
indications that the broad grant of authority held by this
environmental agency is real.'76 Its 1997 publication of the
National Environmental Strategy makes the case for strengthened
efforts at environmental protection by compiling a great deal of
data on issues such as soil degradation, water pollution, and
deforestation as well as suggesting solutions to these problems.
177
Similarly encouraging is CITMA's initiation of a study on curbing
environmental degradation in one of the nation's most important
rivers, the Cauto. 178 Working to make these proposals a reality,
CITMA personnel have begun meeting with other governmental
agencies and local governments to help draft environmental
strategies for these entities.'79 Perhaps most importantly, CITMA
has a role in the formulation of the Cuban budget, giving it some
influence to ensure that its efforts to preserve Cuban resources are
adequately funded.' 80 This evidence highlights the ability of
CITMA to serve as a catalyst for environmental protection in
Cuba.
Though CITMA has been more effective than COMARNA,
some argue that CITMA is still hamstrung by Cuba's communist
form of government. Under this form of government, the State is
responsible for a disproportionately high level of the nation's
economic activity and pollution.18" ' Given this governmental
Ministers of November 28, 1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY].
175 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 73.
176 See generally NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY, supra note 174.
177 Id. at 9-18.
178 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 108.
179 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 22.
180 Id.
181 Rajendra Ramlogan, Protection of the Environment in Cuba: Piercing the
Caribbean Iron Curtain, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 37, 89-90 (1998).
[Vol. 30
CUBA
structure, many believe CITMA is unable to prevent most
environmental damage, because it is caused by an authoritarian
government that answers to no one.1 12  Difficulty in curbing
environmental abuse by the State is magnified in Cuba because the
country does not permit the operation of independent
environmental organizations.183 History has shown that mandating
environmental compliance from government industries is difficult,
particularly when these enterprises are under economic strain.'84
CITMA "has a significant task ahead"' 85 in its attempts to protect
the environment in an economy featuring such prevalent
government ownership.
In addition to these difficulties inherent in the structure of
Cuban government, CITMA has the great responsibility of
implementing Law 81, which contains little specificity. For
example, Chapter XII of this legislation provides a right to legal
action for "whomever has personally suffered" damage pertaining
to Law 81.186 While measures allowing an individual to
supplement or ensure governmental enforcement of existing
regulations are valuable,'87 Law 81 does not delineate how a
person can exercise this right, 188 making the provision's practical
182 Id. at 89, 100-01.
183 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 295. The general
importance of public participation in environmental decision-making is discussed in
greater detail later in this Comment. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
The potential power held by independent environmental organizations of governmental
policymakers is illustrated by the recent efforts of the Sierra Club to force Vice President
Dick Cheney to disclose records from his energy policy task force. Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court for D.C., 124 S.Ct. 2576 (2004) (holding that the lower court had acted
prematurely in rejecting the Vice-President's request to block disclosure).
184 Houck, Cuba's New Law of the Environment, supra note 101, at 8. In supporting
this point, Cuban legal scholar Professor Oliver A. Houck points out American difficulty
regulating government run industries such as the Hanford and Fernald nuclear facilities
and locally-run municipal sewage treatment plants. Id.
185 Id.
186 Law 81, The Law of the Environment, Ch. XII, art. 71, in CUBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF
CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1999).
187 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 1056.
188 See Law 81, The Law of the Environment, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE
FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION (1999).
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use debatable. Even more problematic is the deficient punishment
scheme of Law 81, which provides that any Cuban individual and
entity "will be sanctioned with fines in an amount to be
determined on a case-by-case basis" for violations of The Law of
the Environment.189 The potential power behind this provision is
diluted by the fact that no schedule of fines is provided for
violations within the legislation, 9 ° leaving a potentially arbitrary
system of enforcement in its stead. Therefore, it is too early to tell
whether CITMA has the wherewithal necessary to translate the
broad mandates promulgated by Law 81 into concrete
improvements in the Cuban regulatory system.
On the whole, the recent creation of CITMA and its
empowerment through Law 81 represents a qualified success.
Elevating environmental protection to the level of a cabinet-level
ministry and giving it implementation authority resolves the most
important problems that plagued Cuban environmental law in
recent decades. Nevertheless, problems associated with Cuba's
communist regime and a lack of specificity in its environmental
law could mitigate these advances. If the regime continues its
trend towards a more flexible application of communist
governance"' and CITMA is given the authority to fill in the gaps
in Law 81,192 there is hope that CITMA can mitigate
environmental degradation.
b. Environmental Impact Assessments
In addition to empowering CITMA, Law 81 improves the
Cuban environmental framework by providing "mechanisms for
incorporating environmental considerations into development
projects" through EIAs.193  ElAs are systematic reviews of
projects, policies, and programs with the goal of assessing the
environmental impact of an action before a decision is allowed to
go forward.' 94 Cuba's adoption of EIAs is noteworthy because
189 Id. at Title I1, Ch. XI, art. 68.
190 See id.
191 See SMITH, supra note 69, at 308.
192 See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
193 Travieso-Diaz, supra note 167, at 389.
194 Amparo E. Avella, The Process of Environmental Impact Assessment in Cuba, in
5 CUBA IN TRANSITION 396, 396-98 (1995).
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many commentators believe EIAs are central to successful
regulatory regimes'95 and represent "the seminal concept in
modem environmental law.' 1
96
The breadth of EIA requirements incorporated in recent years
into the Cuban regulatory scheme is vast. Cuban EIAs require
consideration of the cumulative impact of a project rather than
weighing individual portions of a program independently. 97
These assessments are conducted by CITMA-approved, randomly
selected consultants'98 and are paid for by the organization seeking
approval for the project in question. 199 In assessing the project, the
consultant must identify alternative development plans, including
those that are the "most environmentally favorable." The
consultant must also consider the option of not developing at all.2"'
While not all projects are subject to EIAs, the number assessed in
Cuba has increased throughout the years20 ' and now includes all
government projects20 2 as well as "any other project or activity
occurring in a fragile ecosystem, that significantly alters that
ecosystem., 203 Particularly important, given the large amount of
foreign money in Cuba's burgeoning tourist industry,204 is the fact
that foreign investment must be based on the principle of
sustainable development 2 5 and CITMA has the authority to
195 See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 801 (2d ed. 1994); Houck,
Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 26;.
196 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 26.
197 MINISTRY OF SCI., TECH. & ENV'T, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION PROCESS, art. 15 (1999) [hereinafter RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION PROCESS]. Demonstrating
its practical power in application, Houck notes that "as opposed to reviewing the impacts
of specific road projects" this requirement would require "comprehensive reviews of
transportation programs." Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 28.
198 RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION
PROCESS, supra note 197, art. 39-5 1.
199 Id. art. 26.
200 Id. art. 25.
201 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 27.
202 Id. at 28.
203 RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION
PROCESS, supra note 197, at art. 6.
204 Trumball, supra note 67, at 307. In fact, tourism is the top source of foreign
currency input into Cuba's economy. Id.
205 See generally Law 77, Foreign Investment Law, available at http://www.
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subject foreign projects to EIAs.20 6
The step forward undertaken by Cuba through the
incorporation of EIAs becomes apparent when these requirements
are compared to those of more developed nations. For example,
the mandatory inclusion of alternatives in Cuban EIAs compares
favorably to similar requirements in the European Union, where it
has taken generations for alternatives to become an integral part of
the assessment process."7 Furthermore, Cuban consideration of
cumulative project impacts is more advanced than the European
Union environmental framework, which contains no such
obligation.20 8 Similarly impressive is Cuba's creation of an EIA
rubric more advanced than its American counterpart in the
identification of projects requiring assessment.2 9 While the
environmental framework in the United States determines the need
for ElAs on a case-by-case basis,210 CITMA lists the types of
projects that will trigger assessment,211 arguably making the
process more systematic and less arbitrary.
Though "laudable,"2 2 many argue the structure of the Cuban
communist regime will thwart the impact of Cuban EIAs. As
mentioned above, most of Cuba's economic activity originates
with the State; as a result, the State is the largest polluter in the
nation.213 Thus, conflicts between government as environmental
medioambiente.cu/legislacion/leyes/L-77.htm. Sustainable development is defined by
the Cuban government as the "process of sustainable and equitable improvement of the
quality of human life, through which economic growth and social well-being are
achieved in harmony with the protection of the environment in a way that satisfies the
needs of present generations without placing the needs of future generations at risk."
Law 81, The Law of the Environment, Title One, Ch. I, art. 8, in CUBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF
CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1999).
206 Id.
207 William R. Sheate, The Environmental Impact Assessment Amendment Directive
97/lJ/EC-A Small Step Forward?, 6 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 235,239 (1997).
208 See Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 28.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION
PROCESS, supra note 197, at art. 5.
212 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 73.
213 Ramlogan, supra note 181, at 89.
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regulator and government as economic stimulator inevitably
arise.214 These realities lend credence to the concern that "EIAs
will only be pro-forma documents used to justify already-made
investment decisions by the State. 21 5
These fears are magnified by the lack of public participation in
the Cuban EIA process. Commentators have noted that "one of
the most important... components... [in] effective
environmental protection.., is public participation in
environmental decision-making. 2 6 This is particularly true when
dealing with EJAs. In this context, public participation ensures
that affected parties have access to necessary information,21 7 that
development decisions take public input into account, 2 8 and most
importantly, increases public confidence in the fairness of
governmental decisions.2"9  Recognizing these benefits, the
American system places a premium upon including the public in
decision-making; 22° a similar commitment does not exist in the
Cuban regulatory scheme. There is no public participation in
defining the scope of the assessment undertaken by the Cuban
government, 22 ' no right to appeal the lack of or allegedly defective
assessments conducted by CITMA,222 and information in EIAs is
not usually made available to the public.223 While there are efforts
under way to increase the level of public consultation in decision-
making,224 this is an area in which Cuba must improve in order to
214 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
215 Travieso-Diaz, supra note 167, at 390.
216 Neil A.F. Popovic, The Right to Participate in Decisions that Affect the
Environment, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 683,708 (1993).
217 William A. Tilleman, Public Participation in the Environmental Impact
Assessment Process: A Comparative Study of Impact Assessment in Canada, the United
States, & the European Community, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 337, 343 (1995).
218 Id.
219 See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1669, 1758-60 (1975).
220 40 C.F.R. § 1503 (1989).
221 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 37.
222 Id.
223 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 585.
224 Id.; see also EVENSON, supra note 78, at 24 (discussing how "the search for
solutions to the economic crisis and the survival of socialism required broad popular
consultation in order to build a consensus around necessary reforms").
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lend credibility to its EIA regime.
Deficiencies in Cuban assessments are not limited to the
problems associated with the governmental structure of
communism. At present, the process of EIA preparation is
suspect. For example, Cuba requires those seeking development
permits to pay for the preparation of EIAs,225 raising the specter
that developers may blacklist consultants with reputations for
26striking down projects. This problem is perversely solved by
the lack of CITMA-approved consulting firms to conduct EIAs.
In the late 1990s, one firm prepared 95% of all assessments.227
While potentially solving difficulties pertaining to blacklisting, it
is too much to expect one firm to have the resources to thoroughly
review nearly every development project or program in Cuba.
Finally, the power of the Cuban EIA to serve as a vehicle for
change is challenged on numerous fronts. As was the case with
CITMA, the Cuban impact assessment regime is challenged by the
lack of specificity in Law 81.228 Additionally, the mandatory
assessment of alternative development plans is frequently
undermined as the "locations of new hotels, other structures, and
even roads and bridges are generally fixed before the detailed EIA
is completed., 29 There are also serious concerns that assessments
are not sufficiently thorough and are considered "as afterthoughts
225 See RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT EVALUATION
PROCESS, supra note 197, art. 38.
226 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 33.
227 Evenson, supra note 78, n.232.
228 See, e.g., DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 74. As was the case
in its aforementioned delegation of authority to CITMA, oversights within Law 81 pose
potential obstacles to the Cuban EIA system. In listing projects for which an EIA will be
required, Chapter IV, Article 28 of Law 81 includes "facilities for the management,
transportation, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous waste." Law 81, The Law of
the Environment, Ch. IV, art. 28(d), in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE FRAMEWORK
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1999).
It does not define what constitutes a hazardous waste or what qualifies as management,
transportation, storage, or final disposal of such a waste. See id. As anyone familiar
with the United States hazardous waste disposal statues can testify, what constitutes a
hazardous waste, or a transporter, storage facility, or final disposal site of such a waste,
is subject to a great deal of debate. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 232-59. Without
an explicit definition of hazardous waste and related terminology, Cuba's attempt to
require EIAs for such material runs the risk of being unnecessarily complicated and
potentially arbitrary.
229 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 585.
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rather than integral parts of the planning process. 3 °  While
difficulties such as these are expected in a program in its early
stages, such shortcomings must be rectified before Cuban EIAs
can make an impact.
The measures taken by Cuba in recent years to give
environmental considerations a role in development decisions are
encouraging. Remarkably, this tiny, developing nation facing
serious economic difficulties has, in certain portions of the EIA
process, superseded the requirements of the United States and
European Union. Despite these accomplishments, there are
serious structural shortcomings in Cuba's assessment regime.
Many contend that these shortcomings are products of the nation's
method of governance, but other shortcomings result from the EIA
process and the legislation empowering CITMA to conduct ElAs.
Though the government has taken positive steps in recent years,
these holes must be plugged if the impact assessments are to reach
their full potential.
2. Results under the New Environmental Framework
While reviewing Cuban legislation provides useful information
in determining whether the country has deviated from the "race to
the bottom," it cannot conclusively answer this question. Legal
scholars agree that pollution in Latin America "is not due to an
absence of environmental laws," '231 but to lax enforcement of
existing legislation.232 Though certain trends are discernible
through review of environmental legislation, "implementation will
be a severe test of the Cuban government's commitment" to the
environmental laws it has enacted. 3 Recognizing this fact, this
230 DiAz -BRIQUETS & PEREz-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 74. Exemplifying this
potential shortcoming is the fact that "project documentation regarding treatment and
disposal of liquid wastes has tended to be very general, at best making reference to the
general treatment that would be used but without detailing design specifications,
expected efficiency levels, expected quality of effluents after treatment, and other key
parameters." Id.
231 Armin Rosencranz et al., Rio Plus Five: Environmental Protection and Free
Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 527,529c (1997).
232 Donna Lee Van Cott, Regional Environmental Law in the Americas: Assessing
the Contractual Environment, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 489, 503-04 (1995);
Rosencranz et al., supra note 231, at 529.
233 Houck, Cuba's New Law of the Environment, supra note 101, at 6.
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Comment focuses on Cuba's record of environmental protection in
the fields of forestry, agriculture, and coastal zone management to
compile a more complete analysis of the current state of
environmental protection in Cuba.
a. Forestry
Cuba's most successful venture in environmental protection
has been its ambitious reforestation program. Shortly after taking
power in 1959, the Castro government undertook an aggressive
program aimed at reversing centuries of drastic deforestation.234
The need for such a policy was dire, as this island, which once had
95% of its land covered by forests,235 had only 14% forest cover
by the late 1950s.236 In order to replenish Cuban forests, the
communist government set limits on annual cutting rates 237 and
planted 2.5 billion trees between 1960 and 1990.238 These planting
efforts grew more vigorous over time. In fact, by the late 1970s,
the number of trees planted by the government was double the
level of 1960, and by 1989, three times as many treses were
planted than were planted in 1979.239 The positive effect of this
program is undeniable: 500,000 hectacres of Cuban land have
been reforested since the Cuban Revolution,240 stemming five
centuries of consistent deforestation2 41 and increasing the level of
tree cover from 14%242 to 21%.243
The communist reforestation program has not been an
unqualified triumph, however. Efforts at reforestation, while
successful in quantity, have not always been successful in the
quality of trees planted. Plantings in the early 1960s focused
234 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 143-46.
235 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 4.
236 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 141.
237 WESTOBY, supra note 133, at 132.
238 DIAZ-BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 146. These efforts at
reforestation were often focused on the reclamation of degraded areas. THE GREENING
OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 134, at 65.
239 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 151.
240 Ross, supra note 133, at 103.
241 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 141 [Table 6.1].
242 Id. .
243 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 5.
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244
almost exclusively on eucalyptus trees, a tree not particularly
well-suited to Cuba's environment2 45 and one which can promote
246erosion. Similar problems plagued the government's planting of
casuarina trees at popular beach destinations; ultimately, the
government uprooted these trees due to the extensive erosion they
were causing. 247 Additionally, reforestation has been much more
expensive than necessary.2 48 The aforementioned suspect planting
decisions, coupled with poor seedling care, have resulted in high
tree mortality rates necessitating further costly tree plantings.249
Despite these problems, on the whole, Cuban reforestation has
been a praiseworthy achievement. 2" Even prior to the recent
improvement of the environmental framework, Cuba implemented
a successful forestry program. In the face of economic crisis in
the 1990s, Cuba continued to produce positive results in this
field.25' Unsatisfied with its seeming victory, the Castro
government has set a goal of achieving 27% tree cover by 2007.252
These accomplishments are unique in Central America and the
Caribbean,253 as Cuba is the only nation in the region to reverse
deforestation trends between 1959 and 1992.254
b. Agriculture
Cuban agriculttre is a locus of one of the most radical
environmental shifts since the onset of the "special period." In the
first three decades following the Revolution, Cuban agriculture
was characterized by its chemical and machine-intensive nature.255
During this period, fertilizer use increased tenfold, and pesticide
244 Ross, supra note 133, at 103.
245 Id.
246 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 152.
247 Id.
248 Ross, supra note 133, at 103.
249 See id.
250 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 145.
251 See Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 5-6.
252 Id. at 5 n.28.
253 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 145-46.
254 Id. at 145.
255 Carmen G. Gonzalez, Seasons of Resistance: Sustainable Agriculture and Food
Security in Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 685, 708 (2003).
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use increased fourfold.256  This level of chemical input greatly
superseded that of comparable Caribbean and Central American
countries257 and led to a plethora of environmental problems. Due
in part to its heavy reliance on chemicals, 17% of Cuban
agricultural land suffers from acidification, while 64% is affected
by erosion.25 ' Further problems were caused by misuse of
mechanized farming techniques during this era. The
misapplication of irrigation technology 59 and the extensive use of
heavy equipment 26° was a partial cause for poor drainage and soil
compaction, respectively.261
Following its economic collapse in the 1990s, Cuba shifted
from a chemical and machine-intensive strategy to one that
promotes organic agriculture 26 2 and the use of traditional farming
techniques.263 Spearheaded by the Agricultural Ministry, the
Cuban government worked to convert "the agricultural sector to
low-input, self-reliant farming practices."" Gone were chemical
fertilizers, pesticides, and tractors; in their place came
biofertilizers, ecological pest management techniques, and oxen.265
Supporting this shift, Cuban scientists promoted green manure
crops and the creation of natural fertilizers.266
The broad reformation of Cuban agricultural practices is
demonstrated in statistical evidence. Following the collapse of the
Soviet Union, imports of fertilizers, pesticides, and petroleum
256 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 105.
257 Id. at 106-07.
258 Sergio Diaz-Briquets, Land Use in Cuba Before and After the Revolution:
Economic and Environmental Implications, in 10 CUBA IN TRANSITION 162, 168 (2000).
259 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 97.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 712.
263 DtAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 91.
264 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 723 (citing Peter M. Rosset, Cuba: Ethics,
Biological Control, and Crisis, 14 AGRIC. & HuM. VALUES 291, 294 (1997)).
265 Fernando Funes, The Organic Farming Movement in Cuba, in SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURE AND RESISTANCE: TRANSFORMING FOOD PRODUCTION IN CUBA, at 15-18
(Fernando Funes et al. eds., 2002).
266 Hector Saez, Resource Degradation, Agricultural Policies, and Conservation in
Cuba, in 27 CUBAN STUDIES 40, 59 (1997).
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dropped by seventy-seven, sixty-three, and 53%, respectively.2 67
These developments seemed likely to curb problems not only
pertaining to erosion and acidification but also to soil compaction,
as Cuban heavy machinery lay dormant without the fuel to run.268
Additionally, estimates suggested that upwards of one-third of
arable Cuban land was cultivated using organic farming
methods.269  These numbers were higher in certain agricultural
fields as nearly 50% of fresh vegetables and 65% of rice were
grown using organic techniques.27 °
While these statistics evidence the recent successes in making
Cuban agricultural practices more eco-friendly, the durability of
this trend is questionable.27' Agricultural reforms often took place
due to scarcities in food, fuel, chemicals, and machine parts as
opposed to a redoubling of environmental efforts.27 2  This raises
the possibility that once the means are available, Cuba will return
to its chemical and machine-intensive past. Further underscoring
this fear is the fact that restructuring in this field has hurt
agricultural output, 27 3 decreasing production by 33% from 1990 to
1994.274 This drop in productivity resulted in "the caloric and
protein intake of the population" falling and "the first indicators
seen in decades of possible malnutrition." '275 The need for greater
food security may ultimately force Cuba to abandon its alternative
agricultural development model in favor of more traditional
chemical and machinery-driven practices.276  For now, it is clear
that the "special period" has resulted in the communist
government enacting agricultural policies consistent with the goals
267 Id. at 58.
268 Id at 58-59.
269 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 727.
270 Id.
271 See id. at 730-31.
272 See id. at 686 (noting the paucity of fertilizers and herbicides since the fall of the
Soviet Union).
273 See DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 252.
274 MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES, supra note 64, at
328.
275 THE GREENING OF THE REVOLUTION, supra note 134, at 4. In fact, the "average
daily caloric and protein intake by the Cuban population may have fallen by as much as
30% from the levels achieved during the 1980s" by the early 1990s. Id. at 22.
276 See Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 730-31.
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of environmental protection.
c. Coastal Zone Management
Perhaps the ultimate testing ground for Cuban environmental
policy is in the field of coastal zone management. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban government placed a great
deal of hope for revitalizing its economy in the tourism industry.277
These efforts have proven successful as Cuba now generates over
$2 billion annually in direct revenue from tourism,278 nearly a
three-fold increase in its share of the Caribbean tourism market.279
This revenue increase correlates with an influx of tourists.
Vacationers, hailing largely from Europe, Canada, and Mexico,28 °
have visited the island in numbers increasing from 158,000 in
1984281 to more than 1,000,000 in 1996282 to 1,800,000 in 2000,283
and the Cuban government expects between 5,000,000 and
7,000,000 tourists by 2010.284 With an increase in tourists comes
larger demands on the tourism industry: in 1994, there were 159
hotels with 23,000 rooms, 3,000 rooms were added in 1995,285 and
by 2000 there were nearly 40,000 rooms.286
In the face of an exploding level of tourist interest and the need
for revenue, Cuba took steps to protect its coastal zone.287 Central
to these efforts was the enactment of Decree Law 212 in 2000.288
277 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 545-47.
278 Id. at 547.
279 Nicholas Crespo & Charles Suddaby, A Comparison of Cuba's Tourism Industry
with the Dominican Republic and Cancun, 1988-1999, in 10 CUBA IN TRANSITION 352,
352 (2000). In 1988, Cuba held under 3% of the Caribbean tourism market; by 1999 this
figure had increased to 8%. Id.
280 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 557.
281 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 262.
282 Charles Suddaby, Cuba's Tourism Industry, in 7 CUBA IN TRANSITION 123, 123
(1997).
283 Travieso-Diaz & Trumbull, supra note 73, at 185.
284 Id.
285 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 262.
286 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 558.
287 See DIAZ-BRiQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 263; Houck,
Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 43-47.
288 See Decree-Law Number 212 (Environment Directorate of the Cuban Ministry of
Science, Technology and Environment, Environmental Defense, and Tulane University
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This statute establishes the general principle that land in the
coastal zone, an area extending inland from the high water mark at
least twenty meters,289 "shall preferably remain unoccupied"290 and
mandates that, where land in this area becomes unoccupied,
"locating new permanent facilities will not be allowed" unless
certain prerequisites are met.291' Expanding upon these general
requirements, the legislation specifically forbids "the creation of
new residential or lodging areas" and "the expansion of existing
buildings" in the coastal zone.292 In addition to these regulations,
Cuba promotes itself as a destination for those interested in
"ecotourism, ' '293 defined as "responsible travel to natural areas that
conserves the environment and improves the well-being of local
people., 294  Attempting to create an ecologically friendly tourist
industry,295  Cuba founded the National Commission for
Ecotourism. 296 In short, the same signs of legislative gains visible
on a larger scale in CITMA and EIAs are also apparent in the field
of coastal zone management.
There is evidence that these legislative advances have resulted
in improved protection of Cuban coastal areas in the "special
period." During this period, air, soil, and, most important for
protection of the coastal zone, water pollution have dramatically
decreased.297 There are indications that the Cuban government is
willing to vigorously enforce its water quality legislation. For
example, in 1997 the government sued the "Roberto Ramirez"
Sugar Mill for toxic dumping in the Bay of Niquero.298 Perhaps
2000) (translating Cuba's Environmental Decree-Law No. 212).
289 Id. art. 4. The amount of inland land regulated varies with the type of coast. For
example, the coastal zone stretches only twenty meters inland from a low terrace but
forty meters inland from the beach. Id.
290 Id. art. 15.1.
291 Id. art. 15.2.
292 Id. art. 16.
293 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 263; Whittle et al., supra note
101, at 561.
294 MARTHA HONEY, ECOTOURISM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: WHO OWNS
PARADISE? 6 (1999) (quoting Ecotourism Society Newsletter 1, no. 1 (Spring 1991)).
295 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 263.
296 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 561.
297 See DiAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 256.
298 Id. at 71.
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most encouraging is the apparent success of the National
Commission for Ecotourism: revenue from ecotourism increased
from $11 million in 1999 to $19 million in 2000 and reached $25
million by 2001 .299 These statistics provide hope that Cuba might
continue to be "spared many of the impacts associated with
extensive coastal sprawl and development" and maintain its "many
miles of beaches, undeveloped coastlines, and intact reef
systems. 3 °0
Nonetheless, there are numerous environmental problems that
continue to threaten the Cuban coastal region. Coastal water
pollution, identified by CITMA as one of the most serious
environmental problems facing Cuba in the early twenty-first
century,3"1 originates largely from the ongoing failure to regulate
organic discharges into bodies of water.30 2 In 1995 alone, the
largest 117 sources of pollution in the nation dumped 247,000 tons
of biodegradable organic material into coastal areas, an amount
"equivalent to the expected discharges of a population nearly 50%
larger than that of Cuba."3 3  More recent studies indicate that
fewer than one in five of the nation's major sources of water
pollution adequately treats wastewater before discharge.30 4 In
addition, more than 70% of domestic wastewater, including human
sewage, is either untreated or receives only primary treatment
before being discharged into the sea.30 5
Another challenge in protecting Cuban beaches is the danger
of sliding towards "Caribbean-style, foreign-owned tourism" that
places economics over the environment. 3" An example of thistype of development run amok is found at the most popular Cuban
299 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 561-62.
300 Id. at 539.
301 See CITMA, CUBA: ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-10 YEARS
AFTER Rio DE JANEIRO SUMMIT "RIo+10" 38 (2002) [hereinafter Ro+10].
302 See DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 135-6; Whittle et al.,
supra note 101, at 540.
303 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 309.
304 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 540.
305 Id.
306 Martha Honey, Tourism and the Environment, in Ti-E CARIBBEAN
ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN 10-12 (1996) [hereinafter Honey, Tourism
and the Environment].
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beach resort, Varadero Beach.3 °7 In the past, "a diverse natural
complex of mangrove swamps, pristine cays, coastal caves [and]
sand dunes" dotted this portion of the coast; today, "only relics of
these natural systems/habitats remain."308  In their place, a golf
course, forty-one hotels, and numerous nightclubs have been built
in the last decade.30 9 Given the presence of these "sun and fun"
tourist destinations, many skeptics believe Cuba's emphasis on
ecotourism is simply "window dressing over the island's
mushrooming conventional tourism" industry.310
The water pollution and development issues have contributed
to a startling loss of biodiversity in coastal areas,31" ' making
preservation of biodiversity a principal Cuban environmental
concern in the twenty-first century.312 The discharge of organic
materials poisons coastal environments, resulting in algae blooms,
fish and shellfish kills, coral reef degradation, and the loss of sea
grasses."' In addition, environmentally insensitive development
projects, such as the one at Veradero, can destroy habitats and
disperse native species.314 These factors help explain why nine of
twenty-one Cuban bird species as well as a litany of other species
of reptiles, amphibians, and mammals are currently endangered or
threatened.315
At present, notable policy gains are offset by the failure to
address numerous environmental issues in the arena of Cuban
coastal zone management. Environmental policy in this field
compares favorably to that of other nations in Latin America,
316
but serious problems still persist. Alarming rates of water
pollution, coupled with examples of questionable development
decisions, have negatively impacted biodiversity at and around
307 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 542.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Honey, Tourism and the Environment, supra note 306, at 10-12.
311 See Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 542 (discussing the effect of development at
Varadero Beach on local biodiversity).
312 Rio+10,supra note 301, at 32-39.
313 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 540.
314 Id. at 542.
315 Rio+10,supra note 301, at 37-40.
316 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 46.
2004] CUBA
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Cuban beaches. These ongoing problems, along with serious
economic straits, promote concerns that natural resource
preservation could take a backseat to monetary considerations in
future Cuban coastal zone management decisions.
3. General Trends
This brief overview of environmental protection in forestry,
agriculture, and coastal zone management provides a snapshot of
recent trends in Cuban environmental reforms and their results.
This overview makes clear that the Cuban environmental
framework is more impressive on paper than in practice." 7 Cuban
coastal zone management exemplifies this problem: despite the
rigor with which Decree Law 212 targets destruction, problems
persist. Still, positive steps have been taken both in the realm of
legislation and enforcement." 8 These advances were made in the
face of "severely difficult economic times"3 9 during which Cuba
vigorously attempted to attract capital into its economy.3 20 Thus,
this raises questions as to the predictive capacity of the "race to the
bottom."
IV. Analysis
Any meaningful study of the advances in Cuban environmental
regulation must take into account every possible explanation of
this progress. While a strong case can be made that this Caribbean
nation undermines the "race to the bottom," it is necessary to
explore alternative rationalizations for the recent improvement in
Cuban environmental legislation and enforcement. In addition to
considering its potential status as a deviator from the "race to the
bottom," this Comment asks whether recent economic
displacement or the "personalistic" nature of Cuba's communist
317 Id. at 79.
318 There is general information indicating Cuba's environmental laws are not
merely for show. In the second half of 2001 alone, 550 individuals and entities were
sanctioned for environmental violations, 178 fines were imposed for deviation from
statutory regulations, 308 environmental cleanup or compliance orders were issued, and
numerous plants were closed permanently or temporarily for failing to meet
environmental mandates. Oliver A. Houck, Thinking About Tomorrow: Cuba's
"Alternative Model"for Sustainable Development, 16 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 521, 524 (2003).
319 Houck, supra note 145, at 80.
320 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 2-3.
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governance3 21 explain the country's counter-intuitive steps towards
environmental protection.
A. Cuba as Deviator from "Race to the Bottom"
A simple and compelling argument can be made that Cuban
environmental progress in the "special period" undermines the
logic of the "race to the bottom." The Cuban economy was
decimated as the Soviet Union disintegrated. Depression gripped
the island in the early to mid 1990s, 322 as Cuba lost its source of
economic subsidies323 and its major trading partner.324 Responding
to this displacement, Cuba abandoned its relatively cloistered
position as the "producer of primary goods for the more
industrialized" communist economies of the world 325 and adopted
market-based economic reforms.3 26 If the "race to the bottom"
theory holds true, Cuba should have set suboptimal environmental
standards as the country engaged in "a race from the desirable
levels of environmental quality" in order to attract industry in a
competitive marketplace.327 Many environmentalists argue that
Cuba's active pursuit of foreign investment3 28 would only serve to
exacerbate this "race to the bottom.,
329
But in the "special period," Cuba did not engage in "a race
from the desirable levels of environmental quality. ' 3 0 Law 81
31 od3f2eemerged in 1997, 3 1 a period of economic uncertainty,332 and
321 DiAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 5.
322 Id. at 43.
323 Mesa- Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 3.
324 Id.
325 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 17-18.
326 See SMITH, supra note 69, at 308.
327 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1210.
328 See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
329 Rhys Jenkins, Globalisation, Trade Liberalisation, and Industrial Pollution in
Latin American, in INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENT IN LATIN AMERICA, 13, 14-15 (Rhys
Jenkins ed., 2000).
330 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1210.
331 Law 81, The Law of the Environment, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE
FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGISLATION (1999) at 21.
332 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 2-3.
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sought to improve the potential for enforcement of environmental
legislation333 and to promote ecologically sound development.334
Though the results of Law 81 have been mixed, there are examples
of improved environmental enforcement in each of the fields
studied: forestry, 3" agriculture,336 and coastal zone management.337
These improvements provide reason to believe Cuba will address
persisting environmental enforcement problems 38 as it emerges
from its economic tailspin.39  Consequently, while the amount of
current progress is debatable,34 °  the Cuban environmental
framework and prospects for the implementation of this legislative
scheme have improved. A rote application of the "race to the
bottom" would not have predicted such a change.
B. Explaining Cuban Environmental Progress Without
Questioning the "Race to the Bottom "
If this Comment were to conclude here, it would appear that, at
the very least, the "race to the bottom" merits qualification in light
of recent progress made in Cuban environmental regulation.
There are other rationales, however, for these recent improvements
333 Travieso-Diaz, supra note 167, at 388.
334 Id. at 389.
335 See Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 5-6 n. 28 (noting the
increased level of tree cover that has accompanied an ambitious governmental
reforestation program).
336 See Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 708-09 & 727 (chronicling the Cuban policy of
moving away from environmentally destructive, chemically-intensive agricultural
practices to more environmentally friendly, organic techniques and the positive results
associated with this shift).
337 See Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 562 (documenting increased revenue from
ecotourism corresponding with an increased Cuban focus on this as an alternative to
more environmentally destructive "sun and fun" tourist options).
338 See DtAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 135-36; Whittle et al.,
supra note 101, at 540.
339 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 2
(documenting recent improvements in the Cuban economy); Ramlogan, supra note 181,
at 73 (noting that "the absence of adequate [economic] resources represents the greatest
obstacle to protecting the environment in the developing world").
340 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 279-80 (concluding that,
despite advances in the "special period," Cuba's "environmental future appears to be
bleak"); Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 79 (concluding that
recent developments establish that "Cuba has made a commitment to environmental
protection").
in environmental law and implementation that do not call into
question the validity of the "race to the bottom." Before a solid
conclusion can be reached regarding the impact of Cuban
environmental policy developments on the "race to the bottom,"
these other explanations must be taken into consideration.
i. Protected by its Association with the Soviet Union?
Cuba reaped enormous financial benefits through its
association with the Soviet Union from the early 1960s until the
early 1990s.341 Given the atrocious environmental record of the
Soviet Union342 and its other client states in Eastern Europe,343 the
conclusion that Cuba prospered environmentally from its
relationship with these nations is counter-intuitive. There is a
plausible argument, however, that Cuba realized sizable
environmental benefits due its position in the world communist
community.
The first way in which a client-patron relationship with the
Soviet Union potentially protected the Cuban environment relates
to the island nation's "role within the global socialist division of
labor.",3 4  In the economic community that existed between
members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CMEA)3 45 from the 1960s through the 1980s, Cuba's primary
function was as "a producer of primary goods for the more
industrialized economies. 346  This arrangement resulted in it
remaining a predominately agrarian nation.347 Cuba became a
source of agricultural products, such as sugar and citrus, to CMEA
countries.348 Given its access to built-in markets for its goods and
341 Mesa-Lago, The Cuban Economy in 1999-2001, supra note 60, at 3-4.
342 See generally MURRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE
U.S.S.R. (1992).
343 F.W. Carter & D. Turnock, Problems of the Pollution Scenario, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE 189 (F.W. Carter & D. Turnock eds.,
1993).
344 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 18.
345 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 686. The CMEA was a group of Soviet Bloc
nations that formed a trading alliance from which Cuba reaped large economic benefits.
Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 80, at 158.
346 Spadoni, Foreign Investment in Cuba, supra note 80, at 158.
347 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 166.
348 Alvarez & Messina, Jr., supra note 61, at 175.
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enormous Soviet loans and subsidies, 349 Cuba had no need to
engage in pollution-intensive economic activities prior to the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, its industrial base
remained weak,35 and its exploitation of potential Cuban tourist
destinations was minimal.35" ' While these conditions left Cuba
economically vulnerable in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet
bloc, they also help to explain why the island nation suffered
significantly less environmental degradation than its communist
counterparts.352
Notably, the Cuban economic depression resulting from the
collapse of the Soviet Union also produced environmental
benefits.353 In the "special period," Cuba moved away from
chemical and machine-intensive agriculture to a program featuring
more environmentally friendly organic farming techniques.354
While beneficial to the environment, much of this shift was
motivated by economic shortages. Without the aforementioned
preferential market for Cuban goods or Soviet subsidies, 355 the
country experienced a dearth of chemical agricultural inputs such
as fertilizers and herbicides.356 Economic displacement resulted in
other environmental benefits during the "special period." For
example, "reductions in imports of fuels, raw materials, machinery
and spare parts... reduced industrial activity and therefore air,
soil, and water pollution associated with such activity during the
special period." '357 It is impossible to escape the conclusion that
many recent Cuban environmental occurrences were motivated by
economic shortfalls, and not an environmental awakening.
349 MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES, supra note 64, at
284. For example, between 1986 and 1990, Cuba received $11.6 billion in loans and $10
billion in price subsidies from the Soviet Union. Id.
350 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 17-18.
351 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 555-56 (noting that investment in the Cuban
tourist infrastructure only began as the collapse of the Soviet Union grew near).
352 DiAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 17.
353 See, e.g., id. at 244.
354 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 687.
355 See, e.g., MESA-LAGO, MARKET, SOCIALIST, AND MIXED ECONOMIES, supra note
64, at 289.
356 DIAZ-BRJQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 252; Gonzalez, supra note
255, at 686;.
357 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 256.
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The above evidence points out that environmentally beneficial
policies and efforts at environmental preservation have,
occasionally, had nothing to do with a desire to protect the
environment. In particular, the lack of industrial pollution and
recent eco-friendly developments in the field of agriculture arose
out of the economic realities of Cuba's partnership with the Soviet
Union. There are those who would expand this argument,
believing all recent initiatives "have almost solely responded to
economic necessity rather than to a newly discovered fondness for
nature on the part of the political leadership." '358 While explaining
certain reforms, it is difficult to imagine a short-term economic
rationale for Cuban efforts at reforestation or protection of its
already comparably clean coastal areas. In short, economic
necessity associated with the collapse of global communism was
one, but not the only, impetus for the broad overhaul of the Cuban
environmental protection regime.
ii. Cuban Form of Governance
As discussed previously, some believe Cuba's communist
form of government impedes environmental gains in numerous
ways. From the fact that the government makes most of Cuba's
economic and environmental decisions359 to the lack of
independent environmental organizations,36 ° critics argue that the
structure of the Cuban government often makes environmental
protection more difficult. It is therefore surprising that the Cuban
method of governance may have contributed to recent
environmental reforms. In fact, there are those who believe
"Castro's personalistic governing style ' 3 61 played a pivotal role in
recently renewed Cuban interest in environmental protection.362
Central to this argument is the fact that the Cuban form of
government is more suited to undertake quick changes in policy
than, for example, the American democratic system. In contrast to
the U.S., where legislation is subject to congressional, presidential,
judicial, and public scrutiny, Cuban decision-making is highly
358 Id. at 279.
359 Ramlogan, supra note 181, at 89.
360 DIAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 275.
361 Id. at 5.
362 See Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 15-18.
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centralized.363 The power to legislate is vested constitutionally in
the Cuban National Assembly.364 Given that this body has become
more democratic in recent years,365 this is similar to the American
republican form of governance. Unlike the United States
Congress, however, the powers of the Cuban National Assembly
are sharply curtailed. This body meets for less than ten days each
year.3 66 More importantly, by the time legislation make its way to
the National Assembly, it has already been signed off on by the
Communist Party.367 In short, the National Assembly has neither
the time nor the authority to challenge Party control in the realm of
policymaking.
Streamlining the process of Cuban governance even further is
the lack of unbridled critique of Communist Party decision-
making. The three major Cuban newspapers, Granma, Juventud
Rebelde, and Trabajdores are state run and do not promote serious
debate on political issues. 3 68 Rival political organizations are not
allowed.3 69 Leaders of "dissident" groups are subject to arrest and
imprisonment, 370 and the government is quick to act against "those
that attempt to publicize their opposition to the foreign press and
embassies or to form party-like associations., 371  The Cuban
Constitution does recognize mass organizations,372 and these
groups are generally consulted by the Party on issues relating to
363 DiAz -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 5.
364 EVENSON, supra note 78, at 17.
365 Id. at 24-27. In the early 1990s, Cuba introduced voting reforms which allowed
the general public some say in its representation in the National Assembly. Id.
366 Id. at 30. The Cuban National Assembly does have nine permanent
Commissions which "hold meetings throughout the year to debate issues, draft
legislation and review proposed legislation submitted to the" larger body. Id. at 29.
367 See id. at 30.
368 Id. at 42.
369 See id. at 31.
370 Id. at 39-40.
371 DEBRA EVENSON, REVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY CUBA 35 (1ST ED. 1994).
372 EVENSON, supra note 78, at 18. Cuban mass organizations include the Central
Organization of Cuban Trade Union (CTC), the Committees for Defense of the
Revolution (CDRs), the Federal of Cuban Women (FMC), the National Association of
Small Farmers (ANAP), the Federation of University Students (FEU), and the Federation
of Students of Intermediate Education (FEEM). Id.
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their concerns.373 Unfortunately, these organizations were often
used as mere means to implement Communist decisions.374 In a
positive development, in recent years the Party has stopped
directly nominating individuals to leadership posts in these
organizations and permitted them greater autonomy, promoting the
hope that in the future they can serve as vehicles for independent
popular participation in policymaking.375
At present, however, "it is inconceivable that legislation would
be adopted which had not first met with" approval by the Party.376
Accordingly, a great deal of authority lies in the hands of the
leader of the Cuban Communist Revolution, Fidel Castro.37 7
While his stature is often inflated to extremely high levels of
omnipotence,"' it is an inescapable reality that "no major policy
decision is made without Castro's approval, and he is known to
sometimes intervene in small matters. 379  This level of
personalistic governance can produce negative results.
Exemplifying this is Castro's obsession with bringing nuclear
power to his tiny Caribbean nation,38° an unsuccessful venture
abandoned only after $1.1 billion was spent. 8
In the case of environmental protection, however, Castro's
high level of control has arguably led to more positive results. At
the 1992 World Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Castro lauded the
theme of justice through environmental protection, proclaiming:
If we want to save humanity from destroying itself, we have to
distribute more equitably the riches and the available
technologies on this planet. Less luxury and pilfering from a
few countries for less poverty and hunger for the rest of the
earth. No more transfer to the Third World of lifestyles and
habits of consumerism that ruin the environment. Make human
living more rational. Apply international economic order that is
373 Id. at 27.
374 EVENSON, supra note 371, at 25-26.
375 Id. at 30.
376 Id. at 29.
377 Id. at 1.
378 DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 5.
379 EVENSON, SUpra note 371, at 5.
380 See DIAZ -BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 203-32.
381 Id. at 211.
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just. Use all the science necessary for sustainable development,
without pollution.382
While it is possible to dismiss these words as rhetoric, within the
year the Cuban Constitution had been amended to stress the need
for "sustainable economic and social development" to ensure "the
survival, welfare, and security of present and future
generations." '383 This emphasis on "sustainable development" and
"future generations" is co-opted from the lexicon of the World
Summit.384 Based on this evidence, Cuban environmental law
scholar Professor Oliver A. Houck concludes that at Rio "Castro
embraced this environmental revolution, brought it home, and put
it in the new constitution, unleashing a chain reaction that is still
running its course." '385
Though it is impossible to discern the exact impact of the
World Summit, the available evidence suggests that Castro was
influenced by what he heard and saw in Rio. Given the
centralized nature of the Cuban government,386 Castro was able to
take the lessons of the World Summit home and translate them
into legislative realities. More than merely parroting the verbiage,
Cuban reforms, from the emphasis on organic agriculture387 to the
investment in ecotourism,388 mirror the sustainable development
encouraged at Rio.389 While other factors played their part, Cuba's
political will to construct a more environmentally friendly nation
motivated recent developments as well.
C. Does Cuba Undermine the "Race to the Bottom?"
Based on the foregoing, there are plausible arguments
supporting both the conclusion that Cuban environmental
development deviates from or can be explained by the "race to the
382 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 16 (quoting Fidel Castro
at the World Summit).
383 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, ch. I, art. 27 (Gisbert H. Flanz
ed., 2000).
384 See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
385 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 18.
386 See supra text accompanying notes 363-79.
387 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 727.
388 Whittle et al., supra note 101, at 561.
389 Houck, Environmental Law in Cuba, supra note 145, at 17.
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bottom." Exposure to market competition did not lead Cuba to
engage in "a race from the desirable levels of environmental
quality"39 as proponents of the "race to the bottom" might have
predicted.39' Instead, Cuba improved its environmental
framework392 and took steps to enhance its implementation of
these laws.393 This does not necessarily mean that the logic behind
the "race the bottom" is flawed. Many of the counter-intuitive
steps Cuba took to upgrade the protection of its resources have
their roots in the country's unique economic 394 and political
system.395
In judging the alternative explanations of recent developments,
the weight of the evidence leads to the conclusion that Cuba does
not support Revesz's revision of the "race to the bottom." Nothing
in Cuba's recent steps to curb environmental degradation lends
support to Revesz's claim that market competition produces
"presumptively beneficial" environmental results. 396 A review of
Cuban environmental policy and enforcement in the fields of
forestry, agriculture, and coastal zone management undermines
this assertion. Those areas which have been relatively insulated
from market competition during the "special period," forestry
397
and agriculture,398 have also been relatively sheltered from
potentially destructive environmental practices. On the other
hand, Cuba's coastal region, an area directly impacted by
governmental attempts to encourage foreign investment and attract
revenue,399 hosts an exploding tourist industry which, if unchecked
by regulation, could irreparably damage these unique
390 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1210.
391 See Stewart, Environmental Decisionmaking, supra note 10, at 747.
392 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 163-168.
393 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 169-175.
394 See supra text accompanying notes 344-357.
395 See supra text accompanying notes 359-379.
396 Revesz, supra note 1, at 1253.
397 See WESTOBY, supra note 133, at 132; Ross, supra note 133, at 104 (noting that
production of Cuban forest products has remained steady during the 1990s).
398 Gonzalez, supra note 255, at 687 (noting that during the "special period," "Cuba
shifted from an export-oriented, chemical-intensive agricultural development strategy to
one that promoted organic agriculture and encourage production for the domestic
market").
399 See supra text accompanying note 88.
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ecosystems.0
While not supporting Revesz's indictment, Cuba does
underline that the "race to the bottom" predicts behavior most
accurately when dealing with market-based, democratic
economies. Cuba's unique economic role in CMEA left it in
economic straits with the collapse of communism, 40' and ongoing
strife with the United States impedes efforts to transform its
economy.402 Nearly fifteen years after the fall of the Soviet Union,
Cuba remains a predominantly agrarian economy without the
means to resort to more polluting industries to bolster its economy
because it is still largely isolated from market competition.4 3 In
addition, in the midst of a depression, Cuba's highly centralized
government unpredictably launched ambitious environmental
reforms.40 4 Compare this political maneuver with the United
States, where environmental controls are often blamed for slowing
down economic growth. 4 5 Given this popular notion, it is hard to
imagine democratically elected politicians campaigning for stricter
environmental requirements for industry in the face of economic
problems.4 6  These features explain Cuba's deviation from the
"race to the bottom," and the fact that they are unique to this island
nation saves the theory from major revision.
400 The aforementioned Varadero Beach exemplifies the dangers of "sun and fun"
tourist destinations. See supra text accompanying notes 312-314.
401 Espino, supra note 63, at 360.
402 See supra text accompanying notes 113-114 & 136.
403 DIAZ-BRIQUETS & PEREZ-LOPEZ, supra note 68, at 166.
404 See, e.g., Law 81, The Law of the Environment, in CUBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: THE FRAMEWORK ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AN INDEX OF CUBAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION (1999).
405 Holly M. Mock, Interstate Competition for Jobs and Industry Through Laxity of
Environmental Regulations: Pennsylvania's Response and the Effects, 7 DICK. J. ENVrL.
L. & POL'y 263, 265 (1998) (noting that the implementation of environmental regulations
are often accompanied by "worries from the business world about the cost of complying
with the deluge of new laws and how these costs would affect the businesses and the
economy as a whole").
406 In fact, the opposite is often true. For example, since coming into office, the
Bush administration has worked to removed obstacles for coal miners, in part, to ensure
"a steady supply of cheap, domestic coal at a time of instability in global oil and natural
gas markets." Joby Warrick, Appalachia is Paying Price for White House Rule Change,
WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2004, at Al.
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V. Conclusion
Seeking to address a lack of empirical evidence in the "race to
the bottom" discourse, this Comment has focused on recent
developments in Cuban environmental law. Setting the stage for
this discussion, this piece chronicled the near universal acceptance
of the "race to the bottom," its application in the international
context, and its recent re-evaluation sparked by Professor Richard
L. Revesz. This Comment noted that the vast majority of
discussion on the "race to the bottom" focused on theory rather
than empirical evidence. Attempting to remedy this deficiency,
this Comment conducted an intensive study of developments in
Cuban environmental framework and enforcement. From this
evidence, this Comment concluded that, while not following the
pattern predicted by the "race to the bottom," Cuba also does not
provide support for Revesz's presumption that market competition
produces appropriate levels of environmental regulation.
In addition to this conclusion on the ongoing vitality of the
"race to the bottom," this empirical study also provides insight
into the trajectory of Cuban environmental regulation. Instead of
lending support to Revesz's revision, Cuba's adoption of more
stringent environmental legislation and more thorough
enforcement mechanisms in the face of economic troubles merely
highlights that the "race to the bottom" cannot accurately predict
governmental behavior in every circumstance. In this case,
Cuba's unique, and somewhat isolated, agrarian economy and
centralized government led its policy to deviate from the path
predicted by the "race to the bottom." These same factors,
however, point to future challenges to those interested in
protecting this island's ecosystem. If Castro's death is
accompanied by a relaxation of the United States embargo, then
capital will likely flood the Cuban economy.4"7 A less centralized
post-Castro regime, a distinct possibility,40 8 may adopt the
previously muffled Cuban viewpoint that environmental protection
"might well obstruct development by establishing such demanding
407 See Coleman, supra note 59, at 89 (stating Cuba has been deprived of $67 billion
in trade by forty years of American sanctions).
408 EVENSON, supra note 371, at 1 (noting a great deal of the power over the Cuban
government is currently held by Castro).
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standards for a country beleaguered by. so many difficulties. 4 °9 In
short, though this Comment notes a full fledged "race to the
bottom" is currently dormant, it is possible that changing political
circumstances in Cuba could make this theory applicable in the
near future.
Though the prediction that the "race to the bottom" could play
out in Cuba following Castro's death is supported by compelling
evidence, it is important to avoid drawing sweeping conclusions
on the vitality of this theory from a one nation analysis. The data
on the impact of Cuba's recent environmental reforms is too
anecdotal410 and its economy still too insular411 to definitively test
the "race to the bottom." Even more problematic is the paucity of
empirical research on the "race to the bottom:" only one such
study had been conducted prior to this Comment.4 12 Two studies
of a theory which animates numerous environmental regulations is
inadequate. Further research is needed to either confirm or dispel
the findings of this Comment and Engel's prior study. Given that
theory "often fails to capture the unique features of the ecological
domain,"4 3 thorough empirical testing of the "race to the bottom"
is necessary to ensure that current and future domestic and
international regulations are grounded in a sound theoretical
foundation.
This call for further research is not to say this Comment has
been for naught. Though it has not resolved the current scholastic
maelstrom surrounding the "race to the bottom," it has elucidated
recent changes in Cuban environmental regulation, demonstrated
the power of economic and political will over environmental
regulation, and noted that market competition potentially impedes
optimal environmental regulations. Most importantly, however, it
409 Santos, supra note 164, at 15 (describing the minority view opposing the
implementation of Law 81); see also supra note 405 and accompanying text. The belief
that environmental controls slow economic growth could have even greater power in
Cuba than the United States, given its comparative economic disadvantage.
410 See supra notes 176-180 and accompanying text. Research on the impact of
recent reforms in Cuban environmental legislation would help to answer many of the
questions left unanswered by this Comment on the efficacy of these developments.
411 See supra text accompanying notes 110-114.
412 See supra text accompanying notes 51-56.
413 Esty, supra note 40, at 613.
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has highlighted shortcomings in the "race to the bottom ' 414 and its
recent critique415 and underlined the need for additional empirical
testing of these theories.416
CHRISTOPHER A. BROOK
414 See supra text accompanying notes 401-406.
415 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 120-124.
416 See supra text accompanying notes 410-413.
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